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All usIncumbent politicians tend to receive more votes when economic con-
ditions are good. In this paper we explore the source of this correlation,
exploiting the exceptional evidence provided by the Spanish Christmas
Lottery. Because winning tickets are typically sold by one lottery outlet,
winners tend to be geographically clustered. This allows us to study the
impact of exogenous good economic conditions on voting behavior.
Wefind that incumbents receive significantlymore votes in winning prov-
inces. The evidence is consistent with a temporary increase in happiness
making voters more lenient toward the incumbent, or with a stronger
preference for the status quo.I. IntroductionThere is substantial evidence showing a robust correlation between eco-
nomic outcomes and the reelection of incumbent politicians in elec-1269
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Alltions.1 While the existence of economic voting seems to be a stylized
fact, its causes are not yet well understood. In a context of asymmetric in-
formation, voters may interpret economic conditions as a signal of an in-
cumbent’s ability or effort and thus apply a simple retrospective voting rule
(Nordhaus 1989). Economic voting may also be partly due to voters’ sys-
tematic attribution errors. There is experimental evidence in social psychol-
ogy finding that subjects aiming to assess competence systematically fail
to take sufficient account of background or environmental factors (Ross
and Nisbett 1991).
It is difficult to disentangle empirically why economic outcomes affect
voting behavior. There are at least two challenges that are common tomost
empirical studies tackling this issue. The first problem is how to identify
variations in economic conditions that are independent from incumbents’
actions.2
Second, even in the case of seemingly exogenous events in which in-
cumbents may not have direct control over the event itself, the incum-
bentsmay be plausibly held responsible by voters for either (lack of) prep-
aration or response.3 If voters hold positive priors about the incumbent,
the additional information will tend, on average, to decrease support for
the incumbent (Asworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2014).
In this paper, we try to overcome these issues by exploiting the excep-
tional evidence provided by a unique randomized natural experiment: the
Spanish Christmas Lottery. This lottery, held every Christmas, offers sev-1 According to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007), approximately 400 books and articles
on economic voting have been published. The earlier studies focused on the relationship
between US voting behavior and a number of measures that capture the macroeconomic
situation (Gosnell and Coleman 1940; Kramer 1971; Fair 1978). Lewis-Beck (1988) provides
similar findings using data from national elections in OECD countries. More recently, Bren-
der and Drazen (2008) examine a large panel of countries and find a correlation between eco-
nomic growth and incumbents’ reelection in less developed countries and new democracies,
but not in developed countries, with the exception of theUnited States.
2 Wolfers (2007) finds that, in the United States, voters in oil-producing states tend to re-
elect incumbent governors during oil price rises and attributes it to voters’ attribution errors.
Brunner, Ross, andWashington (2011) exploit exogenous shifts to labor demand to identify
the impact of economic conditions on policy preferences. They find that positive economic
shocks reduce the support for redistributive policies.
3 There is a body of research that exploits evidence from either natural disasters (Healy
and Malhotra 2010) or terrorist attacks (Gardeazábal 2010; Montalvo 2011).
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1271eral convenient features. First, the Christmas Lottery is a syndicate lot-
tery: around 75 percent of Spaniards participate in the lottery, and they
typically share tickets with family, friends, and coworkers. In other words,
the Spanish Christmas Lottery is more of a social event than a gamblers’
lottery (Garvía 2007). Second, its economic impact is very large: Spaniards
spend approximately €3 billion on the Christmas Lottery, amounting to
about 0.3 percent of the Spanish GDP (in 2008, the average Spaniard
spent €70 on the Christmas Lottery). Third, instead of awarding one
big prize to a few individuals, as is the case in most lottery systems, the
top prize, known as “the Fatty” (el Gordo), is awarded to several thousand
individuals sharing the same ticket number. Each winner receives around
€15,000 per euro played, and the standard ticket costs €20. Winners of the
second and third top prizes receive €5,000 and €2,500 per euro played, re-
spectively. Because each number is mostly sold by one lottery outlet, win-
ners tend to be geographically clustered. For each year of the period we
consider, the province where the Fatty was sold receives an income shock
equivalent, on average, to 3 percent of its GDP. The provinces where the
second and third top prizes are sold receive an income shock equivalent
to 1 percent and 0.5 percent of GDP, respectively.4 The remaining 47 prov-
inces in Spain typically receive about one-third of the total amount they
spent via minor prizes, approximately 0.1 percent of GDP.
Given these features, this paper uses provincial information on Christ-
mas Lottery top prizes and expenditure, from 1986 through 2011, to iden-
tify random variations in annual provincial income. We find that the wind-
fall brought by the Christmas Lottery has a significant effect on national
electoral outcomes. In a province receivingChristmas Lottery awards equiv-
alent to 1 percent of per capita GDP, the incumbent party enjoys a sig-
nificant increase in the share of votes of approximately 0.21 percentage
points. In terms of the number of awarded tickets, the incumbent obtains
an additional 0.6 vote for every winning ticket sold in the province.
Because the incumbent cannot affect which province receives the Fatty,
it would appear that voters should not be rewarding the incumbent. How-
ever, some individuals may fail to understand the random nature of a lot-
tery (as in Guryan and Kearney [2008]). To investigate this issue further,
we use information from surveys that were run every year shortly after
Christmas. This evidence does not support the existence of an attribu-
tion error. Christmas Lottery prizes increase the (self-reported) propen-
sity to vote for the incumbent, but they do not affect respondents’ assess-
ment of the government or the opposition.
There are at least two possible explanations that are consistent with the
observed evidence. It might be due to psychological factors: perhaps when4 At the local level, the impact of lottery prizes tends to be much larger. For instance, in
2011 there was only one person in the winning town who did not possess a winning lottery
ticket (New York Times, January 31, 2012).
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Alleconomic outcomes are good, voters become more lenient toward the in-
cumbent; maybe because they feel happier. This hypothesis would be con-
sistent with the evidence in the study by Healy, Malhotra, andMo (2010),
who, using information from a completely different setting, find that the
outcome of US local college football games just before an election affects
the incumbent’s reelection. On the basis of this evidence, they argue that
personal well-being might influence voting decisions on a subconscious
level. Another possible explanation is that when voters become richer,
they becomemore conservative and, in turn, their preference for the sta-
tus quo is strengthened.
Our paper belongs to a growing literature that is turning to lottery data
in order to examine the importance of exogenous (unearned) income
shocks on a number of decisions.5 Our paper shares a caveat with other
lottery studies in that our results may not be typical responses to other
forms of unearned income. However, our paper differs from other lottery
studies in at least two important respects. First, the Spanish Christmas Lot-
tery is an unusual lottery system of syndicate play. In contrast to most lot-
tery systems, which are gamblers’ lotteries, a vast majority of Spaniards par-
ticipate in the Christmas Lottery, making it more of a social event. Second,
lottery studies typically analyze the effect of unexpected exogenous in-
creases on individual income. Here we study the effect of an income shock
that simultaneously affects several thousand households residing in the
same geographic area. In that sense, the Spanish Christmas Lottery pro-
vides a unique setting to study how improvements in economic condi-
tions affecting a whole community are connected with the reelection of
incumbents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the background information on Spanish elections and the Spanish Christ-
mas Lottery. Section III provides a description of the data, and Section IV
turns to the empirical analysis. Section V discusses the results and presents
conclusions.II. BackgroundSpain is a relatively young democracy. After Franco’s death in 1975, a con-
stitution was passed establishing Spain as a democratic constitutional mon-5 For instance, Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) study the effects of lottery prizes
on labor supply, earnings, savings, and consumption. Other authors have analyzed the effect
of lottery earnings on health and mortality (Lindahl 2005), on physical and mental health
(Apouey andClark 2015), onmarriage anddivorce (Hankins andHoekstra 2011), and on indi-
vidual bankruptcy (Hankins,Hoekstra, and Skiba 2011). Kuhn et al. (2011) analyze how lottery
prizes affect winners’ consumption, as well as their neighbors’. Doherty, Gerber, and Green
(2006) survey lottery winners of varying amounts and observe that those who received higher
lottery prizes show significantly lower support for redistribution policies.
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1273archy. Between 1986 and 2008, the period we consider in this paper, there
have been seven elections and Spain has been ruled by the two main par-
ties: the Partido SocialistaObrero Español (themain left-wing party; hence-
forth Socialist Party) for 14 years and the Partido Popular (the main right-
wing party; henceforth People’s Party) for 8 years.
The Spanish Christmas Lottery (Lotería de Navidad or Lotería del Gordo)
is a national lottery game that is held every year on December 22 and is
considered the biggest lottery event worldwide. It has been organized since
1812 by the National Lottery Organization, a branch of the Spanish Pub-
lic Administration. The draw attracts wide television audiences, and when
the top prize, the Fatty, is drawn, TV cameras travel to the winning loca-
tion to show images of some of the happy winners. All in all, the process
constitutes a popular Spanish Christmas tradition.
In his excellent account of syndicate lottery play, Garvía (2007) explains
how syndicate play arose in Spain in 1862, when the Spanish lottery sys-
tem was reformed. Because lotteries at the time were widely blamed for
poverty and crime—as “many people, and particularly the uneducated,
were unable to control their gambling instincts once they had fallen under
their spell” (622)—the government decided to protect society by making
lotteries unaffordable to the working poor. The rising cost of tickets did
not, however, reduce the lottery’s appeal among the working classes. On
the contrary, revenues steadily increased as a result of the way in which
players responded to the reform: since many of them could not afford to
participate individually, they turned to their social networks and began syn-
dicate playing.
Christmas Lottery tickets have five-digit numbers. Until 2004, there were
66,000 numbers played; between 2005 and 2010, there were 85,000 num-
bers played. Each number is split formally into several smaller units known
as series (during our period of study, an average 150 series of each number
were printed). Each series consists of 10 fractions (called décimos). In turn,
each fraction can be further divided into smaller units or shares (called
participaciones). People usually buy either a fraction, at a cost of €20 each,
or a share at a cost of between €2 and €5. Depending on how many frac-
tions and shares have been sold, for each number there might exist some-
where between 1,500 and 15,000 ticket holders.
Spain’s National Lottery Organization manages the distribution of lot-
tery tickets throughout lottery outlets across the country: 70 percent of rev-
enues are distributed as prizes and the remaining 30 percent are retained
for commissions paid to outlets, revenue for Internal Revenue, and admin-
istration costs. There are three main prizes, which account for approx-
imately half of the total payout. For the top prize, the Fatty, all holders of
fractions of thewinningnumber win €15,000 for every europlayed. The sec-
ond and third prizes awarded winners €5,000 and €2,500 per euro played,This content downloaded from 137.205.202.005 on January 21, 2020 03:37:34 AM
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Allrespectively.6 In practice, a winning player with a fraction of the Fatty was
awarded €300,000. According to the Spanish Survey of Household Fi-
nances (Bank of Spain), this amount represents approximately 10 times
the average household income (€32,000) and slightly more than the aver-
age level of assets held by the average Spanish household (€257,000).
There are also several thousand smaller prizes. During the period consid-
ered in this paper, Christmas Lottery prizes were announced on Decem-
ber 22 every year, but the winners of the main prizes were able to col-
lect their prize only 10 days later, in January. All Christmas lottery prizes
are tax exempt.
Each number is typically sold by one lottery outlet, for a number of rea-
sons:7 first, given syndicate play, people belonging to the same network
like to share the same number; second, it makes distribution easier; and
third, it makes winners more visible. Which particular number is allocated
to each outlet is determined randomly using a computer (National Lottery
Organization 2009). Owing to the lottery design and given that most frac-
tions in each number are sold by only one lottery outlet, the Fatty ends
up awarding many relatively small prizes to several thousand individuals
living in the same area. An exception is the lottery outlet of Sort, a small
village in the province of Lleida, which receives buyers from all over the
country for superstitious reasons (sort is the Catalan word for “luck”). In
recent years Sort has sold ticket fractions with a total value over €100 mil-
lion, about 3 percent of total sales. Another phenomenon that has in-
creased over time is the availability of Christmas Lottery tickets for sale
on the Internet. However, Internet sales of Christmas Lottery tickets re-
main relatively small: only around 2 percent of all tickets are purchased
online.8
Players’ characteristics.—The Spanish Christmas Lottery is not the usual
gamblers’ lottery. According to survey information, 75 percent of the Span-
ish population aged 18 or more buy tickets.9 The expenditure on lottery by
each player is fairly similar. For instance, the average individual in 2004
was planning to spend between €40 and €60, while relatively few people
(less than 8 percent) were planning to spend over €180. Most Christmas
Lottery players (62 percent) buy lottery tickets only in the particular case6 This information corresponds to years 2005–8. Between 1986 and 2004, the prizes per
euro played were €10,000, €4,800, and €2,400, respectively.
7 According to our own calculations using data from the last 25 years, on average, 80 per-
cent of fractions of the winning numbers were sold by one outlet each year.
8 This information comes from a personal conversation with a representative of Ventura
24, one of Spain’s top sellers of lottery tickets online.
9 Spain’s Centre for Sociological Research has surveyed the Spanish population regard-
ing their Christmas Lottery expenditure on six occasions over the period of study. These
surveys where conducted in December 1988, January 1998, January 1999, January 2001, De-
cember 2004, and December 2009 (survey numbers 1,779, 2,274, 2,316, 2,406, 2,587, and
2,824, respectively). They include information from 13,422 individuals.
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1275of the Christmas Lottery; only 10 percent of Christmas Lottery players are
frequent lottery players.
The popularity of the Spanish Christmas Lottery may be due to its po-
tential to induce regret among nonparticipants, as nonparticipants in
a winning (personal or professional) network know that, had they pur-
chased a ticket, they would also have won. Furthermore, individuals tend
to share tickets. According to the survey data, 87 percent of the individ-
uals who participate syndicate play. They share their tickets with relatives
(64 percent), friends (33 percent), or coworkers (28 percent); 54 percent
of players purchase shares (participaciones) at places they frequent. Lottery
expenditure does not seem to be connected to political ideology. Social-
ist Party voters spend, on average, €62; People’s Party voters spend slightly
more: approximately €68.III. DataWe draw information from four sources. First, we use information on
Christmas Lottery top prizes and expenditure. Second, we use electoral
outcome information. Third, we use survey data with information on the
intention to vote and the subjective assessments of citizens on the eco-
nomic and political situation. Fourth, we have collected information on
the main macroeconomic variables available at the provincial level. In the
Appendix we describe the sources of the data. Next we summarize themain
variables.A. Christmas Lottery DataWe use data on awards and on expenditure on the Christmas Lottery by
province. In particular, we observe the province where tickets receiving
the top three prizes were sold, as well as the total number of tickets sold
in each province. Descriptive statistics for the lottery data are provided
in panel A of table 1. The average yearly expenditure on the Christmas
Lottery per province over the period is equal to 0.3 percent of GDP. This
figure has remained stable over the last two decades. Christmas Lottery
prizes amount to 70 percent of sales, approximately 0.2 percent of GDP.
We observe the geographical distribution of the top three prizes, which
make up around half of the total quantity assigned to prizes, that is, roughly
0.1 percent of GDP. We cannot observe the geographical distribution of
the remaining 13,331 small prizes that are awarded in the Christmas Lot-
tery, but given the randomnature of the prizes, it can be safely assumed that
their distribution is proportional to provincial expenditure on the Christ-
mas Lottery. In what follows, by lottery prizes we mean the top three prizes.
Most tickets for the same number are usually sold within a single prov-
ince. Owing to this geographical clustering, provinces where the winningThis content downloaded from 137.205.202.005 on January 21, 2020 03:37:34 AM
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AllTABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics: Information at the Provincial Level
Mean
(1)
Standard
Deviation
(2)
Minimum
(3)
Maximum
(4)
Observations
(5)
A. Christmas Lottery: All Provinces
Expenditure (% GDP) .28 .11 .08 .96 1,300
Top prizes (% GDP) .10 .83 0 20.18 1,300
Expenditure per capita 41 20 8 199 1,300
Top prizes per capita 16 140 0 3,415 1,300
Number of winning fractions 83 325 0 3910 1,300
Winning fractions per capita (%) .02 .11 0 2.65 1,300
B. Christmas Lottery: Winning Province
Expenditure (% GDP) .34 .14 .14 .72 26
Top prizes (% GDP) 3.46 4.76 .41 20.18 26
Expenditure per capita 55 31 22 129 26
Top prizes per capita 557 822 80 3,415 26
Number of winning fractions 1,337 869 80 3,910 26
Winning fractions per capita (%) .47 .62 .04 2.65 26
C. Electoral Data
Electoral roll (in thousands) 639 755 74 4459 350
Voter turnout (%) 73.50 6.02 49.97 84.15 350
Incumbent votes (%) 41.44 9.60 11.45 65.31 350
Socialist Party votes (%) 39.69 8.36 18.40 62.22 350
People’s Party votes (%) 38.10 12.81 7.00 65.31 350
D. Macroeconomic Variables
Population (in thousands) 831 998 91 6,490 1,300
GDP per capita 14,281 3,647 6,113 27,238 1,300
Inflation rate 3.92 1.92 21.59 10.95 1,300
Disposable income per capita 10,397 1,930 6,105 16,985 800
Other transfers per capita 818 192 505 4,023 800
Bank deposits per capita 11,138 4,486 3,871 29,021 1,274
Bank loans per capita 11,873 7,917 1,709 41,114 1,224
Vehicle sales 539 203 181 2,188 1,200
Housing price per square meter 842 412 328 2,555 1,050
Labor force participation (%) 52.28 5.41 38.05 67.25 1,300
Unemployment rate (%) 15.86 7.50 2.96 43.57 1,300This content downloaded
 use subject to University of Chicago from 13
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1277tickets are sold tend to experience relatively large income shocks. Panel B
in table 1 provides information on lottery prizes and expenditure for the
province obtaining the Fatty each year (in terms of its GDP). In the win-
ning province approximately 1,300 fractions are sold, one for every 200 po-
tential voters. Because these fractions tend to be split in smaller shares
(participaciones), this figure should be considered as a lower bound of the
number of individuals receiving lottery winnings. The average income
shock received by the province is equivalent to about 3.5 percent of pro-
vincial GDP and, in per capita terms, to about €500. The magnitude of the
shock is comparable to typical variations in GDP growth at the provincial
level over the period of study (the average GDP growth rate is 2.4 percent,
with a standard deviation of 3.4 percent).B. Electoral DataIn panel C of table 1, we display electoral information from national elec-
tions from 1986 through 2008. In the average province, the electoral roll
is composed of around 600,000 people, with voter turnout at 74 percent.
Incumbent parties received 41 percent of votes on average. Slightly more
votes went to the Socialist Party (40 percent) than to the People’s Party
(38 percent), consistent with the Socialist Party winning five out of the
seven national elections in our sample.C. Survey DataTo complement the electoral data, we have also collected information from
around 100 political surveys conducted during our period of study, cover-
ing information on approximately 300,000 individuals. These surveys are
typically conducted in January, April, July, and October of each year.
Surveys typically ask respondents about the political party they would
vote for were there a national election the following day and the political
party they sympathize with. About 34 percent of respondents declare that
they sympathize with the incumbent, and 28 percent would also vote for her
(table 2). In most surveys, respondents are also asked to evaluate the incum-
bent party using a five-point scale (very good, good, average, poor, or very
poor). In some surveys, the samefive-point scale is used to inquire about re-
spondents’ evaluation of the opposition party and their assessment of the
country’s economic situation and/or the political situation.10 Respondents10 The questions can be respectively translated into English as follows: (1) If the national
elections were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for? (2) In any case, which
of the following parties do you sympathize with more, or which of the following parties do
you consider closer to your own ideas? (3) Overall, how would you describe the manage-
ment task led by the government party: very good, good, average, poor, very poor? (4) In gen-
eral, how would you describe the political action taken by the opposition party: very good,
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Allalso provided information about their voting behavior in the previous elec-
tion. Unfortunately, there is no collection of respondents’ subjective well-
being.D. Macroeconomic DataWe have gathered information on the main macroeconomic variables
that are available at the provincial level, namely, GDP per capita, gross dis-
posable household income (GDHI), population, inflation, bank deposits,
bank loans, unemployment, labor force participation, and car sales.11 Offi-TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics: Survey Information
Mean
(1)
Minimum
(2)
Maximum
(3)
Observations
(4)
Individual characteristics:
Age 46 18 98 290,374
Female .52 0 1 290,374
Educational level:
Primary education or less .61 0 1 290,374
Secondary education .24 0 1 290,374
Higher education .14 0 1 290,374
Occupational status:
Employed .45 0 1 290,374
Unemployed .10 0 1 290,374
Retired .20 0 1 290,374
Student .06 0 1 290,374
Housekeeper .19 0 1 290,374
Political views:
Sympathizes with the incumbent .34 0 1 265,575
Would vote for the incumbent .28 0 1 282,799
Voted for the incumbent in
previous election .32 0 1 287,783
Assessment of the incumbent 3.0 1 5 231,435
Assessment of the opposition 2.7 1 5 177,619
Economic situation 2.8 1 5 214,789
Political situation 2.8 1 5 202,543good, average, poor, very poor? (5) Rega
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1279cial data on housing prices based on market transactions are not available
for our period of study; instead, we use the available estimates produced
by the leading real estate valuation company in Spain. We summarize this
information in panel D of table 1.
Note that while GDP and GDHI are typically highly correlated (there
is a 95 percent correlation in our sample), the former does not include
lottery prize income.12 Lottery prizes are included in the category of house-
hold income “other transfers.” This category includes information on the
disposable income of households that is derived from “scholarships, fines,
lottery winnings, and games of chance.” This information is available only
since 1995.IV. Empirical AnalysisIn this section, we investigate the relationship between economic out-
comes and voting behavior in national elections in Spain. First we ana-
lyze the potential existence of economic voting in Spain. Next we exploit
the random income shocks generated by the Christmas Lottery in order to
deal with the potential endogeneity of variations in economic conditions.A. Economic Conditions and Electoral OutcomesFollowing the standard literature in the topic, in our first specification
we regress the change in votes received by the incumbent on a number
of measures of economic conditions: growth rate in income per capita,
unemployment rate, consumer price index (CPI), and housing prices.
That is, we run the regression
DVotess,t 5 at 1 bDEconomic variabless,t 1 εs,t , (1)
where DVotess,t denotes the variation in the percentage of votes received
in province s by the incumbent party in the national elections between the
election in year t and the previous election, and DEconomic variabless,t
denotes the variation in a certain macroeconomic variable over the elec-
toral term in province s.1312 The GDHI is derived from primary income by subtracting taxes on income and wealth
as well as social contributions and similar transfers and adding all social benefits and mon-
etary transfers (including lottery prizes).
13 In Spain there are no term limits, and for national elections from 1986 through 2008,
it is almost always the case that the incumbent party coincides with the incumbent politi-
cian. The only national election in which the incumbent party had a candidate that was not
the incumbent politician was held in 2004.
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AllThe inclusion of election fixed effects, at, allows us to control for the
effect of factors that may have simultaneously affected voting behavior
in all provinces. The economic changes that we are thus identifying are
variations relative to other provinces in the same term. In all of our re-
gressions, we cluster standard errors at the province level.
In table 3 we report the ordinary least squares (OLS) results from esti-
mating regression (1). We find a positive relationship between the growth
rate of income per capita during the election cycle and the percentage of
votes received by the incumbent. According to the estimates in column 1,
an increase in 1 percent in the growth rate of per capita GDP of a province
relative to the national average is associated with a significant increase
in the incumbent’s votes of 0.33 percentage points. This effect is smaller
than the one estimated by Fair (2009) for US presidential elections: he
finds a figure of 0.68 percentage points. We do not find a significant re-
lationship between the incumbent’s votes and other economic variables.B. Christmas LotteryIn the previous subsection we have documented a positive relationship
between economic conditions and the percentage of votes received by
the incumbent. Nevertheless, it is not clear what this correlation reflects:
it could be that good politicians both create policy conducive to economic
growth and attract votes, but it could also be that, for some reason, eco-
nomic growth leads voters to favor the incumbent. In order to deal with
the endogeneity of economic conditions we exploit the evidence provided
by the Spanish Christmas Lottery.
Given that we exploit information based on the location where lottery
tickets are sold, first we examine whether it is safe to assume that individ-
uals buy Christmas Lottery tickets in the same province where they live
(and vote). Then, we document how the income shocks generated by the
Spanish Christmas Lottery affect macroeconomic variables and voting
behavior. Finally, we use survey information to investigate the mecha-
nism behind the effect of the Christmas Lottery on the votes received by
the incumbent.1. Do People Purchase Lottery Tickets in Their
Province of Residence?We use information on the province where lottery tickets were sold. Some
players, however, may exchange tickets with people in their networks who
live in other areas, or they may purchase tickets while on vacation out-
side their area of residence. Since 1995, the National Accounts calculates
household income at the provincial level including lottery winnings cashedThis content downloaded from 137.205.202.005 on January 21, 2020 03:37:34 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allin the province.14 We use this information to verify that Christmas Lot-
tery winners live in the same province where the lottery tickets were sold.
In particular, we run the following regression:
Dkys,t 5 a 1 bPrizess,t 1 gExpenditures,t 1 εs,t , (2)
where Dkys,t denotes the variation in the household income in province s
between year t and year t1 k, Prizess,t denotes the Christmas Lottery prizes
awarded to province s over Christmas of year t (and effectively collected
in January of year t 1 1), and Expenditures,t refers to the value of Christ-
mas Lottery tickets sold in province s. All variables are measured in per
capita terms. We run this set of regressions for k5 1, 2, 3, 4. For example,
for k 5 1, b captures the impact of Christmas Lottery prizes awarded in
the Christmas of year t (and collected in January of year t 1 1) on the
household income in the province in year t 1 1. All regressions include
population weights, and standard errors are clustered by province. Ad-
ditionally, as a placebo, we also consider the relationship between lot-
tery prizes in a certain year and the variation in income the previous year
(k 5 21).
The estimates from these regressions are displayed in figure 1. As ex-
pected, Christmas Lottery prizes are unrelated to variations in income
over the previous year. National Accounts statistics also show that most
prizes are collected in the province where the tickets were sold: each euro
of lottery prizes implies an increase in households’ disposable income in
the province of 88 cents during the year in which prizes are collected. In
later years, households’ disposable income returns to levels comparable
to those in nonwinning provinces.
We also distinguish between the household income from the lottery
(National Accounts category “other transfers”) and household income
derived from other sources. Christmas Lottery prizes seem to have no ef-
fect on disposable income, other than their direct effect through prizes
collected (upper row, fig. 1).2. The Macroeconomic Effects of the Christmas
LotteryBefore turning to voting data, we examine how the Christmas Lottery
prizes are connected to a number of macroeconomic variables at the
provincial level. This analysis is of interest in itself as it provides us with14 The way prizes are accounted for in the National Accounts has changed over time. Until
2002, Christmas Lottery prizes were assigned to the year during which the prize was collected,
typically the year following the draw. Since 2003, and following European regulations, all
Christmas Lottery prizes are assigned to the year of the draw. In order to deal with this change
in accounting, in our analysis the variables other transfers and GDHI are measured in the year
of the draw until 2002 and in the following year from 2003 onward.
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Allevidence on how individuals react to a temporary and unexpected un-
earned income shock. Additionally, it sheds light about the potential im-
pact of the lottery on nonwinners, which helps to interpret the potential
link between lottery prizes and voting behavior at the aggregate level.
We estimate the relationship between Christmas Lottery prizes and
macroeconomic variables following the specification in equation (2). Ac-
cording to the standard life cycle/permanent income hypothesis, lottery
winners are expected to smooth consumption by increasing their sav-
ings and their durable spending. This prediction is generally supported
by the data. As reported in figure 1, we observe a significant increase in
deposits roughly equivalent to 65 percent of lottery prizes shortly after
lottery prizes are awarded. This effect seems to persist for at least 3 years
following the lottery award. The impact on credit is theoretically ambig-
uous: some lottery winners might be paying off some of their debt, while
some other winners might be using their new collateral to apply for new
loans. In practice, these two effects seem to cancel each other: credit is
not significantly affected by lottery prizes. We also examine whether Christ-
mas Lottery awards affect vehicle sales. We find that in the year following
a lottery prize, the winning province experiences a significant increase in
vehicle registrations that is equivalent to 5 percent of the total Christmas
Lottery winnings. Another possible way to smooth consumption is to in-
vest in housing. Housing prices increase a few years after the prize has
been awarded, but this effect is only marginally significant. The lack of sig-
nificance may be related to the fact that the only available price measure
is based on estimations performed by property valuation companies.
Next, we examine the impact of lottery prizes on the overall economic
activity (GDP, population, and prices). This impact might depend on the
extent to which lottery winners consume goods and services produced
in their province of residence. According to trade data, the majority of
the goods and services consumed in Spanish provinces tend to be im-
ported from other provinces or countries.15 We do not observe any signif-
icant impact of lottery prizes on GDP in the years following a lottery shock.
More precisely, with 95 percent confidence we can rule out increases in
GDP of more than 30 percent of the amount of the lottery shock. There
is no significant effect on either population growth or the CPI.
Finally, we examine the impact on the labor market. On the one hand,
a positive income shock may decrease the labor supply of lottery winners.
The magnitude of this effect would depend on the size of the prize. For
instance, Imbens et al. (2001) find a significant decrease in the labor force
participation of winners of at least $2 million, but they do not find any15 The openness ratio of the average Spanish province between 1995 and 2007 was equal
to 168 percent (C-Intereg database). We thank Carlos Llano for providing us with these
data.
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1285significant effect on the labor force participation of winners of smaller
sums (such as the amounts considered here). On the other hand, some
nonwinners may decide to join the labor force. Results are generally not
significant at standard levels. We observe a small, insignificant decrease in
labor force participation. At the same time, there is a temporary margin-
ally significant decrease in unemployment 1 year after the prize is awarded.3. Christmas Lottery and Electoral OutcomesWe now regress the incumbent’s votes on the Christmas Lottery prizes
awarded in a given province during the term, controlling for lottery ex-
penditure:
DVotess,t 5 at 1 bPrizess,t 1 gExpenditures,t 1 εs,t , (3)
where Prizess,t denotes the total income in Spanish Christmas Lottery prizes
as a percentage of GDP received by province s in the electoral term prior
to year t, and Expenditures,t is the expenditure on the Christmas Lottery
as a percentage of GDP during the same period.
We present OLS results from running regression (3) in column 2 of ta-
ble 3.16 Incumbents receive significantly more votes in provinces awarded
with Christmas Lottery prizes. Receiving 1 percent of GDP in the form of
lottery winnings during the electoral term increases the votes received by
the incumbent by approximately 0.21 percentage points, relative to the
votes obtained by the incumbent in losing provinces.17 This result might
reflect either an increase in votes for the incumbent in winning prov-
inces or a reduction in votes for the incumbent in losing provinces. In
winning provinces, the variation in votes could be due either to changes
in the votes of winners or to spillovers to voters who did not win. That is,
the results in this paper reflect the sum of the effect from lottery prizes on
winners and the effect on the rest of the community. Interestingly, both
GDP increases and Christmas Lottery winnings seem to have an effect of
similar magnitude on the votes received by the incumbent.
In order to isolate the direct effect of lottery prizes on voting in col-
umn 3, we include economic variables together with lottery information.16 Results, available on request, are qualitatively similar if we use Christmas Lottery infor-
mation in per capita terms instead.
17 Above we have considered all the top prizes received by a province over the term prior
to the election. If we distinguish between awards obtained the Christmas right before the
election (on average, 4 months before the election is held) and awards obtained two and
three Christmases before the election, the coefficients of the lagged variables are not sta-
tistically different; but the evidence is consistent with the effect of Christmas Lottery win-
nings fading out over time. If we distinguish between the top, second, and third Christmas
Lottery prizes, only the Fatty leads to a significant increase in the share of votes received by
the incumbent. However, the estimates are not precise. It is not possible to reject the hypothe-
sis that the effect of the different top prizes is the same. Results are available on request.
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AllAs a robustness check, in column 4 we run the same regression, now in-
cluding as controls province fixed effects. In both cases, results remain
unchanged. Thus far we have weighted equally the information provided
by provinces that, in some cases, greatly differ in their size. In column 5,
we reestimate the specification in column 3, now weighting each obser-
vation by the potential number of voters in the province. The impact of
lottery prizes in the weighted regression is three times larger (0.66 per-
centage points), but it is not significantly different from our previous esti-
mates.18 In column 6, instead of the amount of Christmas Lottery awards,
we use the number of winning fractions sold (divided by the number of
potential voters). We find that for every winning fraction sold, the incum-
bent receives 0.6 more of a vote. Because we do not have individual in-
formation on the voting behavior of the recipients of the Christmas Lottery
prizes, we cannot separate to what extent, within provinces, individuals
are voting on the basis of personal economic circumstances or on what they
observe about their neighbors’ economic circumstances. Given the mag-
nitude of the effect, 0.6 vote per winning fraction, our results are con-
sistent with two possibilities: either lottery prizes strongly affect only the vot-
ing behavior of winners or lottery prizes also affect the voting behavior
of some individuals who were not awarded Christmas Lottery prizes.
In column 7 we exclude the province of Lleida from the sample. As
explained before, this province includes the town of Sort (which means
“luck” in Catalan), a town that attracts buyers from all around the coun-
try. Excluding this province improves the accuracy of the estimation, but
the point estimate is basically unchanged. Next we would like to explore
whether the effect is different according to the ideology of the incum-
bent. In particular, incumbent parties favoring less redistributive policies
might benefit more from increases in income (Doherty et al. 2006; Brun-
ner et al. 2011). In columns 8 and 9 we split the sample in two: elections
in which the left-wing was the incumbent and elections in which the right-
wing was the incumbent. Right-wing governments seem to benefit elec-
torally more from economic growth. An increase in 1 percent of GDP is
associated with an increase of votes for the incumbent of 0.51 percentage
points when the People’s Party is in power; the figure is 0.26 percentage
points when the incumbent is the Socialist Party. Similarly, the estimated
effect of lottery prizes is slightly larger for elections in which the right-
wing was the incumbent, but the difference between the coefficients for
the two parties is not statistically significant.18 We have also examined whether the effect of lottery prizes on the number of votes re-
ceived by the incumbent varies depending on provincial GDP per capita, lottery expen-
diture, or population size. The accuracy of these estimations is relatively low, and we cannot
reject the possibility that the effect is similar across different groups of provinces. Results
are available on request.
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1287We have documented the existence of a positive (causal) relationship
between lottery prizes and the share of votes received by the incumbent.
As shown above, lottery awards do not affect population size. However,
lottery prizes may have an effect on the number of people who turn out
to vote. For instance, Brunner et al. (2011) find that positive economic
shocks decrease voter turnout. There is also some additional evidence that
subjective well-beingmight affect turnout (Dolan,Metcalfe, and Powdthavee
2008). In table 4 we investigate this possibility by regressing electoral par-
ticipation on Christmas Lottery prizes and controls. The main determi-
nant of participation is the unemployment rate. An increase in the unem-
ployment rate of 1 point is associated with an increase in participation of
0.20 percentage points (col. 1). The estimated coefficient of lottery prizes
is negative, but it is not statistically significant at standard levels, and the
magnitude is small compared to the effect of lottery awards on the votes
received by the incumbent.
Finally, we check for the robustness of our results using placebo Christ-
mas Lottery prizes. We regress the votes received by the incumbent on the
Christmas Lottery prizes after an election. If the results in this paper are
due to lottery winnings affecting voting behavior, there should be no re-
lationship between the two. Results shown in column 10 of table 3 con-
firm that the Christmas Lottery awards received after the election are not
correlated with the votes received by the incumbent.C. Christmas Lottery and Voting: Evidence from
Survey InformationThe incumbent tends to receive more votes in provinces awarded with
the Fatty. However, we do not know which individuals are affected or the
underlying mechanism. We examine an independent database, a large-
scale survey, in order to investigate these issues. Specifically, we want to
investigate if voters in awarded provinces tend to reelect the incumbent
because (in what would be an example of attribution error) they believe,
somehow, that the quality of the incumbent has improved. In order to
minimize the potential effect of economic spillovers induced by lottery
prizes, we focus our attention on surveys conducted in January, just a few
weeks after the Christmas Lottery. The general specification that we use
is as follows:
zi,s,t 5 Xi,ta 1 bPrizess,t21 1 gExpenditures,t21
1o
t
dtSt 1o
s,t
ls,tDs,t 1 εi,s,t ,
(4)
where zi,s,t denotes the survey responses of individual i in province s at time t;
Xi,t is a vector of individual characteristics; Prizess,t21 denotes the ChristmasThis content downloaded from 137.205.202.005 on January 21, 2020 03:37:34 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1289Lottery income awarded in the province the month prior to the survey as
a percentage of GDP; Expenditures,t21 is the corresponding expenditure
on the Christmas Lottery; St is a set of survey dummies; and Ds,t is a set
of dummies for period and province, where each period includes three
surveys before Christmas (April, July, andOctober) and a survey after Christ-
mas ( January). In other words, we are comparing survey responses in the
same province before and shortly after Christmas.
First, we look at the respondent’s intention to reelect the incumbent.
As can be seen in column 1 of table 5, in provinces recently awarded with
Christmas Lottery prizes, individuals are more likely to state that they in-
tend to vote for the incumbent.19 This effect is significant at the 5 percent
level. The sign of this coefficient is consistent with the results obtained
with the aggregate electoral data (table 3), but its magnitude is larger
(1.2 vs. 0.66, if we consider the effect estimated in the weighted regres-
sion in col. 5 of table 3). This difference may reflect the fact that here
we are capturing the effect of lottery prizes shortly after Christmas. In col-
umns 2–4 we distinguish between respondents according to previous
electoral behavior. The evidence is consistent with lottery prizes having
an effect on voters who did not support the incumbent in the previous
election, but only marginally so. In column 5, we use as the dependent
variable an indicator that takes the value one if respondents declare that
they sympathize with the incumbent. The magnitude of the effect is sim-
ilar but the sample size is slightly smaller, and in this case the coefficient
is not statistically significant.
In column 6, we use the respondents’ assessment of the incumbent as
the dependent variable. The effect goes in the same direction, but in nei-
ther case do we observe any significant association with the Christmas
Lottery prizes. In other words, we fail to find that respondents in prov-
inces awarded with more Christmas Lottery prizes perceive the incumbent
as of better quality. In column 7 we look at the respondents’ assessment of
the opposition party: we do not find any significant relationship with the
Christmas Lottery prizes. In columns 8 and 9 we show results from using
the respondents’ assessment of the economic and the political situation
at the national level as dependent variables, respectively. There is no re-
lationship between either of these and the Christmas Lottery prizes. That
is, voters in winning provinces do not seem to overestimate the economic
situation at the national level: it does not seem that the greater propensity
to reelect the incumbent is due to voters’ wrongly thinking that the na-
tional economic situation has improved. Overall, the evidence does not
point toward the hypothesis of attribution errors.19 Considering prizes awarded 4–7 months prior to the survey yields qualitatively similar
results.
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politicians’ luck of the draw 1291V. ConclusionsThere is a large body of evidence suggesting that good economic out-
comes are associated with the reelection of incumbent politicians. Owing
to the endogeneity of good economic outcomes, the nature of this rela-
tionship is not clear. In order to deal with this problem we exploit the ex-
ceptional evidence provided by the Spanish Christmas Lottery. This lot-
tery, held every year around Christmas, offers several convenient features.
First, its economic impact is very large. Spaniards spend about 0.3 per-
cent of the SpanishGDPon theChristmas Lottery. Second, the Christmas
Lottery is a syndicate lottery: over 75 percent of Spaniards participate, and
they typically share tickets with family, friends, and coworkers. Third, there
are many shares for the same number, meaning that the Fatty awards many
relatively small prizes to several thousand individuals. Because each win-
ning number is typically sold by one lottery outlet, winners tend to be geo-
graphically clustered.
Given these features, we are able to use provincial information on the
Christmas Lottery prizes and expenditure to identify random increases in
provincial income. In the main winning province, approximately 1,300 lot-
tery fractions are awarded. The number of households receiving lottery
earnings is probably larger, given that each fraction is often divided into
smaller shares. We find that, despite the fact that it is understood that the
lottery outcome is completely random, the incumbent party tends to ob-
tain relatively more votes in these provinces. Each lottery fraction awarded
is associated with, roughly, an additional one-half of a vote for the incum-
bent (table 3, col. 6). On aggregate, in the average winning province the
mean income shock is equivalent to 3 percent of provincial GDP, and the
incumbent party enjoys a significant increase in the share of votes: ap-
proximately 0.63 percentage points (table 3, col. 2). This effect is robust
to a number of robustness checks, including the use of provincial popu-
lation weights, provincial fixed effects, placebo lottery prizes, as well as the
exclusion of outliers. Right-wing incumbents seem to benefit more from
lottery prizes, but the difference is not statistically significant. We do not
find evidence supporting the hypothesis that these differences in voting
behavior can be explained by variations in voter turnout.
What is the source of the observed effect? The literature has mainly
relied on two potential explanations for the positive correlation between
economic conditions and incumbents’ electoral performance: asymmet-
ric information (voters learn about politician quality and effort through
economic conditions) or attribution errors (voters are mistaken regard-
ing the cause of good economic outcomes). Our results are not consis-
tent with either of these hypotheses; if anything, they seem to be at odds
with both, given that voters are expected to be well aware of the random-
ness of the Christmas Lottery winnings. Information from surveys span-This content downloaded from 137.205.202.005 on January 21, 2020 03:37:34 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
1292 journal of political economy
Allning our period of study allows us to further investigate the mechanism
underlying this effect. The evidence from survey data confirms that re-
spondents in winning provinces are more likely to vote for the incum-
bent, but they do not think that the incumbent is more competent or that
the national economic or political situation has improved. The relatively
short time elapsed between the Christmas lottery and the survey helps to
minimize the possibility that economic spillovers have affected nonwin-
ners living in the area.
The results in this paper suggest that the positive correlation between
good economic outcomes and incumbent reelection may reflect some-
thing other than voters being uninformed. Increases in wealth may rein-
force voters’ preference for the status quo, or in the same vein, perhaps
when voters are happier, they become more lenient with the incumbent.Appendix
TABLE A1
Data Sources
Variable Source
Lottery data Sistemas Técnicos de Loterías del Estado
Electoral data Ministry for Home Affairs
Survey data Centre for Sociological Research
Population National Statistics Institute
GDP Fundación BBVA and IVIE
CPI National Statistics Institute
Gross disposable household
income (GDHI)
National Statistics Institute
Other transfers National Statistics Institute
Bank deposits and loans Statistics Bulletin, Bank of Spain
Vehicle registrations Dirección General de Tráfico, Ministry for
Home Affairs
Vehicle prices Tax agency and National Statistics Institute
Housing prices Sociedad de Tasación (1986–2008) and BBVA
(1990–2010)
Labor market Labor Force Survey, National Statistics InstituteThis content downloaded from 13
 use subject to University of Chicago Press TeReferences
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